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Introduc tion
Studies suggest tha t trust is a n importa nt c ompone nt in the information disc losure process. Ma ny previous studies have pointed out tha t lack of trust reduces the c ha nc e of achieving conse ns us (e. g. C vetkovic h a nd Lofste dt, 1999; Fis hhoff, 1995 ; Flynn e t al. , 1992; Slovic , 1993) . Some s tudies ha ve also suggested tha t the public distrusts the "a rroga nt spec ialist" (Leiss , 1996; Fisc hhoff, 1995) . T he importa nce of trust has led to a numbe r of methods be ing propose d to deve lop trust (e. g. Ba rbe r, 1983; Cove llo, 1992;  Cvetkovic h a nd Lofste dt, 1999; Pe ter, e t al. , 1997; Sie grist, e t al. , 2003; Slovic, 1993;  Yama gis hi, 1998). Some of these studies ide ntify the role of risk communication as importa nt in de veloping a trusting rela tions hip be twee n suc h diverse groups as citize ns , compa nies , a nd adminis trative offic ials. Howeve r, it is still unclea r as to what a re the most e ffec tive mea ns to acc omplis h this. For e xa mple , whe n developing public facilities suc h as dams a nd sluices, or electric power pla nts , it would appea rs that administrative officia ls a nd c onstruc tion/ e lec tric compa nies would be bette r off to disc lose information about the pla n be fore be ginning cons truction. Information disclos ure is nee ded not only in the ope rating of suc h fac ilities, but also in the pla nning for their developme nt. Howe ve r, in the e ve nt tha t informa tion disc losure alone is ins ufficie nt, me thods for its distribution s hould be eva lua ted. For e xa mple , does outside r 2 involve me nt help to ins till trus t in the process? The a im of this study was to investiga te how diffe re nt me thods for instilling trust a re eva lua ted by the public whe n administrative officia ls a nd compa nies disclose information about importa nt public projects.
Factors for ins tilling trust and information disclosure
Nakayac hi a nd have s hown tha t simple information disclos ure does not, in itse lf, necessa rily inc rease trust. Trus t only occ urs whe n information disc losure func tions to provide assura nce , partic ula rly in s itua tions in whic h defection ca n occur imme dia tely (Ya ma gis hi, 1998; Ya ma gis hi a nd Ya ma gis hi, 1994). In suc h situations , we nee d to cons ide r what kind of information disc losure ca n provide assura nce. To this e nd, we c onsider two aspec ts of the informa tion disclosure process: voluntary dec lara tion of sanc tions a nd involve me nt of outs ide rs.
De clar ation of self-sanctioning be haviors
Sa nctions ca n provide assura nc e in tha t the y ofte n de ter de fec tion (Ya ma gis hi, 1998; Yama gis hi a nd Ya ma gis hi, 1994). Howe ver, sa nctions a re sometimes the cons eque nce of losing trust due to ne ga tive e ve nts. Once trust is los t, it ca n be difficult to rees tablis h, 3 eve n with the imple me nta tion of aus te re sa nctioning. Neve rtheless , Naka yac hi a nd Wa tabe (2005) sugges ted that imple me nting sa nc tions could be a method of e nha ncing trus t if it is imple me nted before trust is los t. In othe r words, if a n orga nization itself volunta rily dec la res sa nctions be fore a n issue bec omes public , the orga niza tion is see n favorably. In the conte xt of information disclosure, whe n the occurre nce of ne gative eve nts is highly unpre dic table , there is no reas on to imple me nt sa nctions since the re is no one to bla me. Howeve r, we propose that it would provide assura nce to a nnounce before ha nd tha t the orga niza tion will impose sa nctions on itse lf if a n incide nt is exposed in the process of informa tion disc losure , eve n whe n the re is no fault on the orga nization itself. T his we ca ll 'de cla ration of self-sa nctions ' or 'voluntary de cla red sanc tions. ' We hypothesize d that de cla rations of se lf-sa nc tioning be haviors , not just those e nforce d by the la w, are importa nt for ins tilling trust, give n that it ca n provide assura nce to the public (Naka yac hi a nd Watabe , 2005) . For exa mple , if a compa ny construc ts a pla nt, a nd if it sets a quality sta nda rd highe r tha n that dicta ted by la w a nd decla res sa nc tions if it fails to ac hieve its goals through some form of punis hme nt (e. g. reduc ing the salary) of the pe rson res pons ible , the n the compa ny is more like ly to ge nerate a de gree of public trust.
Outs ider inv olve ment
The involve me nt of outsiders in the process of information disc losure could also provide assura nce. According to Ya ma gis hi (1998), surveilla nce is a typical mea ns of increasing assura nce , though it carries a cost. Tra nspare ncy functions to provide assura nce , a nd information disclos ure could be one method for increas ing tra ns pare ncy (Naka yac hi and ; Naka yac hi a nd Wa tabe , 2005). Provided tha t the cost paid to improve tra nspa re nc y does not involve muc h obvious be ne fit to the orga nization, information disc losure might be re garded as a s ign of guiltless ness , the reby e nha ncing trus t. Conse que ntly, orga nizations a nd administrative officia ls s hould be trusted more whe n some one outside the orga niza tion is involved in the disclosure process sinc e it is the n see n as more tra nspa re nt.
Who are acce ptable third parties for the information disclos ure process?
Give n that outs ide r involve me nt is importa nt to the proc ess of information disclos ure , who are good ca ndidates for the role? The orga nization would not be trus ted unconditionally re ga rdless of the outsider involved. T his is a n importa nt issue since it is we ll known that eva lua ted le gitima cy has a major influe nce on the perc eive d fa irness of a procedure a nd de cision sa tis faction (Eea rley a nd Lind, 1987; Friedla nd, e t a l., 1973; 5 Ohnuma et al. , 2005; Ras insky, 1987; T hibaut, et a l., 1974; Tyle r, 1990 ; Tyle r a nd Lind, 1992). Give n tha t spec ialists a nd officia ls a re ofte n mistruste d (Cvetkovic h a nd Lofste dt, 1999; Fis hhoff, 1955; Flynn et al. , 1992; Slovic , 1993) , it is likely that they would not be evaluate d as having le gitimacy, where as other parties s uc h as Non Profit Orga nizations a nd Non Gove rnme nta l Orga nizations (NPO/NGOs ), as well as interes ted citize ns , might be evaluate d as having le gitimacy.
At this point it is importa nt to diffe re ntiate betwee n three types of pote ntially rela ted groups -'NPO/NGOs ', 'inha bita nts ', a nd 'c itize ns ' (Ohnuma a nd Nakaya c hi, 2003). NPO/NGOs a re de fined as voluntee rs a nd/or applic a nts who a re willing to be involve d in the dec ision proc ess. Inhabita nts are de fined as being dire ctly involved in the issue as a result of living within the a rea conce rned. For e xa mple , those who a re living in the constitue ncy of a siting ca ndidate are re garded as inha bita nts. Citize ns a re defined as neithe r inha bita nts nor applic a nts , but as indirect inte rested pa rties. Citize ns are dis tinguis hed from dire ctly inte rested parties in that there is no direct ga in from their involve me nt in the issue.
This researc h a tte mpted to e xplore outs ide r involve me nt a nd dete rmine whic h third parties have le gitimacy in the role. 6
Study aims
In summa ry, this study a ims to: a ) ide ntify me thods of instilling trust b) compa re whic h me thod is evaluate d as being importa nt c ) ide ntify who is cons ide red as a le gitimate third party whe n a dminis tra tors a nd orga nizations go through a n information disc losure process a nd d) cate gorize poss ible ca ndidate groups for the third pa rty role.
Me thod
Proce dure
The s urvey a rea was the Ka nto distric t of Japa n, whic h inc ludes Tokyo. T he population is about forty million. Two thousa nd five hundred individuals we re sa mpled using a two sta ge sys te ma tic s tra tifie d ra ndom sa mpling me thod a nd a mail-out s urvey. In the first sta ge , city size was stratified acc ording to the popula tion of eac h munic ipa lity: a la rge city was defined as having a population ove r 200,000, a mid s ize city was de fined as ha ving a population betwee n 50,000 a nd 200,000, a nd a s mall size c ity was de fined as ha ving a population less tha n 50,000. Nine cities were ra ndomly sa mpled from the la rge city group, eight cities from the mid size city group, a nd eight cities from the s ma ll city group. In total, 25 cities we re sa mpled. In the second sta ge , 100 individuals we re ra ndomly sa mple d from eac h city. T he Res ide nt Re gistration List in ea c h municipa lity 7 was use d as the sa mpling list.
The survey was conducted in Nove mber 2003. Six hundred a nd twe nty one responses we re obta ined, providing a response ra te of 24.8%.
Me asures
The surve y was des igne d to measure people's a ttitudes towards public fac ilities a nd the me thods compa nies a nd administrators use to communica te risk to citize ns. T he survey consiste d of ite ms measuring a va rie ty of topics, including a nxiety about risky incide nts , evalua tions of responsibility a nd a ttributions for e nvironme nta l pollution, a nd so on, but only those ite ms use d in the curre nt a nalys is are discussed he re.
The re we re two groups of questions. T he first group c onsis ted of ite ms measuring attitudes towards diffe re nt me thods for instilling trus t in informa tion disclos ure , including the involve me nt of citize ns , e xperts, a nd NPOs ; commitme nt of pe rsons outside of the proc ess ; re gula r contact betwee n re leva nt groups ; a nd decla ra tion of self-sa nc tions (see Ta ble 2). For eac h ite m, res ponde nts indicate d the leve l of trust they would fee l if administrators a nd orga nizations provide d informa tion. T hese measures we re a ns we red on a single 5-point scale ra nging from "a lot of trust" to "no trus t at all".
The second group of questions aske d responde nts to eva lua te the acceptability of 8 possible third parties. Responde nts we re asked to c hoose a ny number of acceptable third parties from the following lis t: politicia ns , gove rnor/mayor, a dminis tra tive offic ials , mass media , NPO/NGO, inhabita nts of the a rea , citize ns inte rested in the issue but not living in the area , a nd acade mics.
Res ults
Demographics
The re were a tota l of 611 responde nts (307 fe male a nd 304 ma le). T he a ge distribution was as follows : less tha n 30 years , 5.7% (n=35); 30 -39 yea rs , 12.0% (n=73); 40-49 years , 16.4% (n=100); 50-59 yea rs, 24. 4% (n=149); 60-69 years , 27.7% (n=169); a nd 70 years a nd ove r, 13.8% (n=84). T here we re no significa nt differe nces in a ge distribution by city size (Ta ble 1). Howeve r, because ma ny of the responde nts failed to indica te the na me of the municipa lity where they live d, a ny conc lusions ma de re ga rding diffe re nces in city size must be made with caution. Avera ging across city size , these res ults a re roughly similar to the actual popula tion a ge distribution of Ka nto distric t, although the rate of individuals unde r the a ge of 30 is low.
Opinions on me thods of instilling trus t
First, we conducted a fac tor a na lys is to class ify the obtained responses into differe nt me thods for ins tilling trus t (principal compone nts e xtrac tion with va rima x rota tion).
Five fac tors were obtaine d (eige nvalues > 1): re gular contact (factor 1), commitme nt of outsider (factor 2), involve me nt of c itize ns in information disclosure (factor 3), decla ration of self-sa nc tions (factor 4), a nd involve me nt of e xpe rts a nd NPO in information disc losure (fa ctor 5; see Table 2 ). Two ite ms, "ide ntify a person who is respons ible a nd has authority, a nd publicize a c hec k syste m of informa tion provision about the orga niza tion a nd national a ge ncies" a nd "es tablis h a pe rma ne nt lia ison window to reply to opinions about the informa tion" , loade d on both factors 1 a nd 4.
Howeve r, give n that the loading was rela tively highe r on factor 1, these ite ms we re included with othe r ite ms indicating re gula r contact.
Eige nva lues a nd the proportion of the total varia nce e xplained by eac h fac tor a fte r rota tion ra nge d from 2.93 (0. 20) for factor 1 to 1.37 (0.09) for factor 5. Howeve r, this does not imply that re gular contac t is more importa nt tha n the involve me nt of expe rts in the informa tion disc losure process. The focus of this study was to eva lua te the responde nts attitudes towards me thods for ins tilling trust, whic h could be a n indicator of its effec tive ness. He nce , mea n sc ores we re calc ula ted for eac h of the obtained five factors. To confirm the relia bility of the obta ined scales , we calculated Cronbac h's alpha c oeffic ie nt for eac h sca le a nd found acceptable re liability: re gular contact α =0.83, commitme nt of outs ide r α = 0.80, involve me nt of citize ns in information disclos ure α = 0.66, self-dec lara tion of sa nctions α =0.68 a nd involve me nt of e xpe rts and NPO in informa tion disclosure α= 0.53. While the coefficie nt for fac tor 5 (e xpe rt and NPO involve me nt) was low, ove rall, sca les were sufficie ntly reliable.
Mea n sc ores for eac h scale a re s hown in figure 1. To c onfirm whethe r mea n scores we re significa ntly differe nt from the mid -point or not, t-tes t a nalyses we re conduc ted.
Significa nt effec ts were obtaine d for a ll sca les (t=25.44 for re gula r contact, t=21.82 for commitme nt of outside r, t=14.22 for involve me nt of citize ns in information disclos ure , t=34.39 for self-decla ra tion of sa nctions , a nd t=20.46 for involve me nt of e xpe rts a nd NPO in informa tion disc losure ; all ps<.01). T hese results suggested tha t all methods we re conside red useful in ins tilling trust. Ne xt, a one -wa y ANOVA (5-levels of Me thod) was c onducte d to tes t whe the r me thods differe d in their ability to ins till trust. T he re was a significa nt main effec t for scale (F= 101.13, p<.01: see Table 3 ). Tukey's stude ntized ra nge tes t (alpha = 0.05) indica ted tha t there we re signific a nt diffe re nc es betwee n self-dec lara tion of sa nctions a nd the other sca les, a nd be twee n involve me nt of c itize ns in informa tion disclosure a nd the other scales (Error DF=2404, EMS=0.40, Critical
Value of Stude ntized Ra nge =3.86). T hese results suggest tha t self-dec lara tion of sanc tions was considered to be the most effective me thod for instilling trust during information disc losure , a nd tha t involve me nt of c itize ns was the leas t effective.
Howeve r, involve me nt of c itize ns in information disclos ure was still see n as effective because the mea n score was greate r tha n the mid-point.
Evaluation of poss ible acce ptable third parties
The second a na lysis concerned poss ible accepta ble third pa rties. As s hown in figure 2, academics a nd c itize ns inte rested in the issue we re cons ide red as the mos t appropriate third parties , followed by inhabita nts of the a rea a nd NPO/NGOs. On the othe r ha nd, politic ia ns , the gove rnor/mayor, a nd administrative offic ials we re cons ide red less appropria te third parties. Mass me dia was also conside red a less appropriate third pa rty.
To exa mine the evalua ted dis ta nce betwee n possib le third pa rties , a cluster a nalysis was conducte d (squa red Euclidea n dis ta nce ; Word's minimum-varia nce me thod).
Results from the clus ter a na lysis s howed three clus ter groups (see figure 3) . Acade mics , NPO/NGO, a nd inhabita nts of the a rea we re groupe d together in the firs t cluste r, whic h was ca lle d 'opinion leade rs'. C itize ns inte res ted in the iss ue ma de up the second cluste r:
'citize ns '. Politic ia ns , the gove rnor/mayor, administrative offic ials , a nd mass me dia we re grouped togethe r in the third c luste r: 'politica l groups '. It s hould be noted that mass me dia we re included within the sa me cluste r as political groups. In contrast, citize ns inte rested in the issue did not clus ter with a ny other third parties , whic h imply that c itize ns might be re garded as a n indepe nde nt pa rty.
Give n that the pattern obse rved depe nds on the me thod used, the results of two additional c lus tering methods were compa red to those of the Word's minimum-va ria nce me thod: results of the a na lyses using c omplete linka ge (furthe r neighbor ma ximum me thod) a nd single linka ge (nearest neighbor minimum me thod) a re shown in figures 4 and 5. Although the c luste ring of Aca de mics, NPO/NGOs , citize ns, a nd inhabita nts was not necessa rily consiste nt ac ross me thods, a ll thre e solutions clus tered mass me dia toge the r with politic ia ns , the gove rnor/mayor, a nd administrative offic ials.
Discussion and c onc lus ion
Summary of the results
The results from this surve y showed that 'self dec lara tion of sa nctions ' was the best me thod to ins till trus t, followed by 'c ommitme nt of outs ide rs'. T he a nalys is of possible acceptable third pa rties s howed that aca de mics, a nd citize ns interes ted in the issue but not living within the a rea , we re eva lua ted as acce ptable third parties , whe reas politic ia ns , the governor/ma yor and administra tive offic ials we re evalua ted as rela tive ly 13 less accepta ble third pa rties. Cluste r a na lyses using three types of e xtrac t methods showed that mass media was included within the sa me c luste r as politica l groups.
The role of mass me dia
The results s howe d tha t mass me dia we re not re garded as a n a ppropria te third pa rty a nd we re included within the sa me clus ter as political groups. One possible inte rpre tation for this result is that mass me dia might be pe rce ived as be ing responsible for sensa tionalizing a n issue a nd not necessa rily acting in a n unbiased ma nner.
Conseque ntly, media sourc es were unable to instill trust in the informa tion disc losure process. Simila r results were obta ined in a nother surve y in whic h mass-c ommunication and journalis ts were included in a less trusted group toge the r with politic ia ns a nd the local authorities (Ce nter for Deve lopme nt of Powe r supply re gion, 1997). T hese results are c urious give n that the func tion of mass me dia is to report information in a n unbiased ma nne r, partic ula rly in weste rn countries. It ma y be that distrust of mass media is only observed in Japa n. Whether or not this phe nome non is unique to Japa n nee ds to be clarified in future researc h.
In contrast to mass media , c itize ns who a re inte rested in the issue but not living within the area conce rned we re re ga rded as acceptable third parties , forming the ir own 14 indepe nde nt cluster. T hese results sugges t tha t the involve me nt of citize ns in information disc losure might improve trus t in the process , pe rhaps beca use tra ns pare ncy is more likely with unbiased third pa rty involve me nt.
Limitations of this study
The re a re a c ouple of limita tions with this study. Firs t, in our questionnaire , we evalua ted se lf-decla ration of sa nc tions , but not sa nctions imposed by outside forces.
Information disclosure with the involve me nt of outsiders was eva luate d, but not information disc losure without the involve me nt of outsiders. As a result, we are u na ble to compare self-dec lara tion of sanctions with imposed sa nc tions , or information disclos ure with a nd without the involve me nt of outside rs. It is importa nt for future studies to resolve these iss ues.
Second, responde nts were asked to respond to a hypothe tica l situation. It is importa nt that we assess the validity of the results of this study with actual case studies.
Despite these limitations , the results of this study still provide us with importa nt information a bout the roles of 'self dec la ration of sa nc tions ' a nd 'information disclos ure with the involve me nt of outsiders ,' in deve loping trus t in public doma in situa tions.
Implications of this study
Function of self-de clar ation of sanctions
The res ults of this study showed that dec lara tion of self-sa nc tioning was the best me thod of the ones we cons ide red to ins till trust in the information disclos ure proc ess.
Nakayac hi a nd Wa tabe (2005) de mons tra ted e mpirically that trust in a c ompa ny increased only whe n self-dec lara tions of sa nctions were imple me nted before a n inte reste d pa rty made a cla im. Fujii (2004) suggested tha t "initiate d apologies" , whic h imply self imple me nted sa nc tioning, inc reases trust. T he res ults of our study are consiste nt with the findings of previous studies. T hese findings s hould e nc oura ge orga nizations to take the initia tive in imple me nting a sa nctioning sys te m whe n needed.
If a n orga niza tion does not imple me nt self-sa nc tions, once a proble m becomes appare nt, the orga nization is like ly to lose trus t comple tely. By ta king the initiative to imple me nt and publicize se lf-sa nc tioning, it is possible tha t the public will perce ive the orga nization as trus tworthy.
One countera rgume nt may be that orga nizations will lose trust in the fac e of a ne gative e ve nt, re gardless of whe the r or not the y dec lared sa nc tions prior to the eve nt becoming known. Howeve r, Fujii (2004) a rgue d tha t "initiated apologies" would have the function of not only e nha ncing trust during uneve ntful times, but also to alleviate loss of trust during crises. It might not be a coincide nce tha t re gula r contact was also re ga rded as importa nt in instilling trust in this study. We nee d to e xplore the rela tions hip be twee n re gular c ontact a nd decla rations of self-sa nctioning in future researc h.
Function of inv olve ment of outsiders in information dis clos ure
The res ults showed that citize ns inte reste d in a n issue we re re garded as a n accepta ble third pa rty. This is also cons iste nt with previous findings. For e xa mple , Ohnuma a nd Nakayac hi (2003) a nd Ohnuma et a l. (2004) provided e mpirica l da ta de mons tra ting that inte reste d citize ns a re c onsid ere d as a n acceptable third pa rty, a nd tha t they a re thought to have le gitimac y as a part of the dec ision proc ess. These findings s hould also enc oura ge the involve me nt of citize ns in the decis ion ma king process as a mea ns for developing public trust. Howeve r, one possible dra wba ck to the involve me nt of c itize ns ma y be the imposition to unwa rra nted obs tacles or delays to the decis ion process. T his might be the case in situations requiring full conse ns us. Howeve r, this is ra rely the case in the information disclosure process , whic h e mphasizes a va rie ty of opinions. T hus , the involve me nt of c itize ns could be a n e ffe ctive mea ns for orga nizations to instill trust.
